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.ABSTRACT 
     For the sake of the Chinese long-term plan for 2010, this paper 
offers a long-term projection by using a post-war Asian Pacific model 
termed 'KYPAC-4'. This model has been reconstructed through co-
research financed by the Chinese Educational Committee and the Japan 
Society for the Promotion of Science, and its estimated average growth 
rate of GDP for the plan is 19.2% in current yuan, or 19.6% in current 
dollars. Although this growth figure is both unexpectedly high and 
higher than other countries, there are some basic reasons to support this 
figure. This paper considers the realism of this figure and other key 
indicators, especially when comparing with our projections to those of 
other Asian Pacific countries. 
    KEYWORDS 
     the Chinese long-term plan for 2010, long-term projection, 
     the Asian Pacific, competitiveness, balance of power, 
     depreciation function
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    INTRODUCTION 
     The APEC meeting held in Osaka in November 1995 strongly 
demonstrated the Chinese presence in the Asian Pacific region. 
However, China's true power comes not only from its present economic 
activity but also from its huge potential for power. In fact, after some 
major western magazines published special editions on China's potential 
in 1992 and 1993 (See Rohwer(1992), Barnathan et al.(1993), Engrdio 
et al.(1993)), the potential became the major interest not only for 
investors but also for economists. For example, the World Bank (1993a) 
projected that GDP of the Chinese Economic Area(CEA), which includes 
mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong, will surpass those of France, 
Italy and U.K. by 2002. Furthermore, it also projected that the CEA's 
GDP will surpass those of the US and Japan by 2002 if they are 
measured in PPP terms of the ICP (International Comparison Project) 
method. 
     In this sense, to estimate China's potential power has become an 
important issue for economists, and the major purpose of this paper is to 
provide a long-term projection for the Chinese long-term plan for 2010 
by using the Kyoto University Pacific Rim Model. This model was first 
reported at the Asian Conference on Statistical Computing held in 
Beijing University in 1993 (See Ohnishi (1993)), and after that was 
reconstructed several times, for example as a project of BAPPENAS 
(National Development Planning Agency, Republic of Indonesia) (See 
Ohnishi (1995)). Because the present version 4 model (KYPAC-4) has 
eight countries and 104 equations', we cannot discuss its details here in 
this paper. 
     Therefore, we will focus only on what are appropriate 
3
characteristics for long-term projections. Section 1 shows ` that our 
model(KYPAC-4) can fulfill these demands. Section 2 considers our 
assumptions for the forecast. Then, sections 3 and 4 show the results of 
our projection for some key indicators, for example, GDP growth rate, 
trade balance and so on. In the final section, we discuss some 
implications that can be obtained from these results.
    1. REQUIRED CHARACTERISTICS FOR LONG-TERM 
PROJECTIONS 
     Long-term projections need some special characteristics for 
forecasting models which are quite different from short-term ones. For 
example, short-term models have to express temporal fluctuations, 
because monetary or fiscal policies can temporally influence economies. 
However, long-term models need not show these effects, because these 
s policies cannot maintain their influence for long periods of time. 
     In other words, we can neglect he demand-side ffects which can 
be created by monetary or fiscal policies. Therefore, models for the use 
of long-term projections must to be supply-side models, and our model 
is one such model. Because long-term models have to describe 
economic structures which are stable or constant for at least several 
decades, demand-side fluctuations are regarded merely as disturbances 
when we estimate the statistical parameters of structural equations. 
     Besides the properties previously mentioned, some special issues 
exist which are related to the long-term projections or policy making in 
Asia-Pacific region. One issue is the rise and fall of Asian-Pacific 
countries. The relative power of these countries has changed 
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dramatically, for instance, witness American decline, Japanese growth 
and the present rapid growth of Asian countries. Long-term models 
must express the trend, because this trend is likely to continue into the 
next century. Our model expresses this rise and fall by simultaneous 
equations whose statistical parameters are constant through the 
simulation period (at least 1954-1993) with the exception of several 
equations. 
     The second important economic issue for long-term projections 
is international capital movement, because the direction of capital flow 
is from advanced countries to developing countries. Typically, a special 
characteristic of our model is that the international capital flows are 
explained by functions of relative wages between advanced countries and 
developing countries2. For example, the Chinese balance of capital after 
its opening policy is estimated by using the OLS method as follows. 
BCc=11 1157-196 38 We/12 j
                  +4*Wu+Wk+25*Wi+25*Wt+25*Wp+4*Wa)/7   (2
.50) (-1.76)(W 
Adjusted R square = 0.161 D.W.=1.679 estimated period; 1982-1993 
     where BCc is the Chinese capital inflow3, and Wc, Wj, Wk, Wt, 
Wp, Wj, Wu and Wa indicate average yearly wage in China, average 
daily wages in manufacturing in Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, the 
average monthly wage in Japan, South Korea, and the average weekly 
wage in manufacturing in the US and Australia respectively4. In order 
to adjust these units as monthly wage rates, we apply multipliers 1/12, 
25 or 4 on Wc, Wi, Wt, Wp, Wu and Wa. 
     Needless to say, these foreign wages depend on the economic 
conditions of these countries, and the conditions are also functions of 
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foreign wages which include Chinese wage rates. Therefore, it is better 
for the models to have foreign country sectors; in other words, to be 
multicountry models. Countries which are included in the KYPAC model 
are Japan, the US, China, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, 
Indonesia and Australia'. 
     In addition, also from a technical viewpoint, the fewer the number 
of exogenous variables which are necessary for forecasts, the more 
reliable the result of the projection is. This is because values of 
exogenous variables cannot be artificial, especially in long-term 
projections. As we will soon see, population numbers are the only 
exogenous variables, except for a few dummy variables, when our model 
is used for projections. 
     The required properties for long-term forecasting models can be 
summed up as follows. 
1) Short-term fluctuations can be neglected, and focus is on the supply-
side. 
2) Long-term estimating periods to capture stable structures are 
necessary. Furthermore, with the stable structures, the models have, to 
express the changes of the phases of economic rise and fall. 
3) International capital movements must to be endogenous. 
4) The number of exogenous variables is few. 
     Because our model undertakes all of the required demands, we 
will use this model for our projection..
2.ASSUMPTIONS' FOR THE PROJECTION 
In this section, we show what the assumptions for the projection 
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are. We make three kinds of special assumptions for the projection: 
population growth, the depreciation ratios of the eight countries and the 
Chinese production function. 
     (1)Depreciation Ratios 
     Because GDPs(Y) are decided by capital stocks(K) as well as by 
population(N) through production functions, and because depreciation 
ratios are crucial in the identification equation of K in our model, 
artificial value of the depreciation ratios make the value of K, Y and 
their whole economies artificial. Therefore, it is better to make a 
reasonable assumption or formation on the depreciation ratios. To do so, 
the best way is to estimate depreciation functions under proper 
specifications. 
     For this purpose, in our model and when it is used for projections, 
we used depreciation equations specified as functions of capital 
coefficients (K/Y) or investment ratios to K (I/K) . The reason for this 
specification is that depreciation ratios may depend on characteristics of 
capital, and if it becomes capital intensive, firms have to depreciate 
rapidly in order' to remove older machines. Therefore, in our 
depreciation functions, the coefficients of K/Y or I/K are estimated as 
plus values. 
     For example, the Chinese depreciation function was estimated as 
follows: 
     dc=-0.0739765+0.13635 *Kc_9/Yc_9 
          (-1.19) (3.37) 
Adjusted R square -= 0.6917 D.W.=1.8 Estimated Period; 1962-1993 
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     where dc, Kc and Yc are the Chinese depreciation ratio, capital 
stock and GDP respectively, and the estimating method is the Cochrane 
Orcutt method under an assumption that error term has 1st order 
autocorrelation6. 
     One more notable point in this equation is that the time lag of its 
explaining variable is very long, that is nine years. This is reasonable, 
because the machines that must be scrapped are. old ones. However, this 
characteristic shortens our estimating period, because one of our 
explaining variable (Kc/Yc) starts only after 1953, and then our 
estimating period changed from 1962 to 1993. 
     Furthermore, not only for this reason but also because some 
depreciation functions, could be estimated only after 1975 or 1983, our 
the simulation period of our final test before the present was shortened, 
covering only 1983-1993. For this reason, we used these depreciation 
functions only for-projections. 
    (2)Populations 
     After making depreciation ratios endogenous, the only exogenous 
variables are population umber, except for a few dummy variables. 
Needless to say, populations are also crucial in our production functions. 
     Population projections can be made reliably by special research, 
and we can use these results. In our case, we used the projections based 
on a report entitled World Population Prospects Estimates and 
Projections as Assumed in 1985, United Nation(1987). According to this 
projection, the absolute population levels and their annual growth rates 
in our eight countries are shown in Table 1.
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     (3)Chinese Production Function 
     For the projection, we used a different production function from 
the original one shown as equation (25) in the APPENDIX. This is 
because the original 'production function cannot follow well the actual 
time series especially after the Chinese opening policy which was started 
by Dongxiao' Ping, although it is better to follow actual data in the final 
test during the entire period 1954-1993. Figure 1 show the actual data 
and partial test estimate, and shows that its fitness becomes worse after 
the second half of 1980s. 
     Therefore, for our projections, we estimated a new production 
function of China that is shown in the last page of the APPENDIX. This 
new production function performs better not only for projections but also 
for the final test, which is done with the depreciation functions after 
1983. In order to identify the -latter model that is added the depreciation 
functions and has new production function, we call this model the TYPE 
II model; the former model is called the TYPE I.
    3. PROJECTED CHINESE FUTURE GDP 
     Under the, assumptions previously discussed, we projected the 
Chinese future GDP and GDP growth rates in current dollar terms, 
although these projections do not include the GDPs in Hong Kong, 
Macao and Taiwan because of their structural difference from mainland 
China. That result in current dollar terms is shown in Table 2-1, a 
comparison with other seven countries. 
    (1)Comparison with Other Countries 
     First in this table we can notice a surprisingly China's high growth 
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rate in current dollar terms, compared with other countries. However, if 
we compare in Table 2-2 from a longer perspective, we can find some 
over-twenty percent growth periods in South Korea and Indonesia. In 
this sense, our projection for future Chinese growth is not so 
unbelievable. 
     Second, this table shows that the high growth periods for these 
countries -are different, and we can observe that these high growth 
periods are moving from Japan to South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia and 
the Philippines. (Refer Figure 2.)' We have to notice that this order of 
take-off is. almost same as the order of GDP per capita. Although, the 
Australian high growth rate period was from 1970 to 1985, and this is an 
exception to the order, we can understand why its growth period was the 
same as ASEAN countries', because the Australian economy is strongly 
influenced by ASEAN economies. Furthermore, Australia's exceptional 
characteristics can be explained by understanding that it is an 
agricultural and mining country and such a structure can be characterized 
as that of a -developing country. With this exception, all the countries 
have their own high growth rate, and this order goes with their GDP per 
capita. Therefore, the Chinese high growth rate period. will come 
immediately. 
     In addition, not only are the future Chinese growth rates 
interesting, but also so are its absolute values. The Chinese GDP will 
also surpass both the Japan and the US before 20.10. Therefore, at the 
end of the next long-term plan, China will have the biggest economic 
power in the world. 
    (2)Estimating Nominal Growth Rate 
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     Although we can assume that current dollar terms can express 
each economy's true power from an international and long-term 
perspective, some targets of a long-term plan are set in each country's 
currency terms. Therefore, it is better to also forecast the exchange rate, 
and translate dollar term values to each currency's terms. For this 
purpose, we estimated the following exchange rate function of China: 
     ERc/ERc_1=1.02339-1.41836*BTc_1/Yc_1 
            (39.16) (-1.36) 
Adjusted R Square = 0.3691 D.W.=1.827 Estimated Period; 1954-1993 
     where ERc and BTc indicate the Chinese exchange rate and 
balance of trade respectively.. Because of its low R square value it is not 
listed in our equation list, but we made a projection of the Chinese 
exchange rate using this equation as a reference as follows. That is, 
   projected absolute value(Y/$) projected annual growth rate 
  1995 2000 2005 2010 1995/2000 2000/2005 2005/2010 
   830 865 863 787 0.8% -0.0% -1.8% 
     As we will soon discuss, in our projection China's future 
competitive power against foreign industries will become stronger, and 
resulting in a better trade balance. In this sense, our projection is 
reasonable, and if so, the future GDP growth rates in current yuan terms 
become 13.5 percent during 1995-2000, 21.2 percent during 2000-2005 
and 23.0 percent during 2005-2010. These figures can be averaged as 
19.2 percent for these fifteen years, and this figure is lower than China's 
actual rate 29.6 percent in 1993, 30.4 percent in 1994 and 27.3 percent 
                     11
in 19958. 
     In addition, there are two econometric forecasts on the Chinese 
nominal GDP until 2000, one is provided by. Bi(1994) and the other by 
the Chinese State Statistical Bureau. According to the former, the annual 
growth rate between 1995 and 2000 will be 21.8 percent, and this figure 
is larger than ours. On the other side, the State Statistical Bureau 
projected that the real term GDP growth rate between 1995 and 2000 will 
be 8.7 percent9, and that the inflation rate will be 8 or 9 percent. 
Therefore, its projection on GDP growth rate in yuan terms is 16.7 or 
17.7 percent, and this figure is also larger than ours., 
    (3)Comparison with the official plan 
     Besides the above-mentioned comparison, there are some official 
targets set by the government. Here we will discuss them. 
     First, the government has set the real term GDP growth rate and 
their inflation target in 1996 at 9 percent and 10 percent respectively. 
These figures make a nominal term GDP growth rate target of 19 
percent, and this figure is larger than our figure 13.5 percent during 
1995-2000. In this sense, our projection can be regarded as not so 
extreme. 
     Second, the ninth five-year plan is set at 8-9 percent GDP growth 
in real terms. Therefore, if this figure is consistent with our projection 
in current yuan terms, the annual inflation rate will have to be 
suppressed to around 5 percent. This figure requires that the government 
to continue its tight credit policy, and in fact curbing inflation is the top 
priority of its plan. This need is consistent with our exchange rate 
projection. 
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     Third, the document adopted by the Fourth Plenary Session of the 
8th National People's Congress reported that real term GNP in 2010 
should be double that of GNP in 2000, and this target can be achieved 
by 7.2 percent real term GNP growth rate during this 10 year period. 
However, in my opinion, this target is too low, because our projection 
of nominal term GDP growth rate during this period is 22.1 percentlo, 
and the inflation rate can be assumed not to significantly surpass 10 
percent. Certainly this figure of 7.2 percent annual GNP growth rate in 
real terms is too small when compared with the actual rate for recent 
years. For example, 13 percent growth was achieved in 1993, 11.8 
percent in 1994, and 10.2 percent in 1995. Surely, after the reformation 
of state enterprise system,' China will develop a more favorable system 
for economic activities. Therefore, a higher growth rate can be expected 
rather than the official target. 
    4. PROJECTIONS OF OTHER KEY INDICATORS 
     Our projections are created not only for GDP or its growth rate 
but also for other important indicators. Therefore, in this section, we 
show the results of our projection on other indicators and analyze them, 
sometimes by comparison with other projections. 
    (1)Projected GDP per capita 
     The projected GDP per capita is shown in Table 3, comparing 
China with other countries, and many notable points are the same as for 
the GDP discussed in .the previous section. However, unlike in the 
previous section, we can compare the projected results with ASEAN 
countries. For example, this table shows that the Chinese GDP per 
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capita will surpass the Indonesian or the Philippine's GDP per capita, and 
approach to the Thailand's until 2010. One explanation may be that the 
Chinese high growth period will start at the present and another is 
China's lower growth rate of population. 
     The above-mentioned ocument of the Fourth Session of the 8th 
National People's Congress also provides a goal that real term GNP per 
capita in 2000 should be four times larger than that in 1980, and to 
quadruple in 20 years requires only 7.3 percent annual growth in real 
term. In addition, the Department of Integrated Statistics of the State 
Statistical Bureau of China projected 7.7 percent annual growth rate of 
GDP per capita in real term. However, these figures are too small for 
the same reason that we discussed on the GNP target in the last section.
     (2)Projected Balance of Capital 
     Another point which we have to. pay our attention to in our 
projection is balance of capital, because our model emphasizes this issue. 
Table 4 shows the result that the China's net capital inflow will maintain 
its high level' until 2005, but after that it will decrease. This trend can 
be understood by the rapid increase in Chinese wage levels in the 
future", because net capital inflow is explained by relative. wage versus 
other countries as shown in section 1. Needless to say, decrease in net 
capital inflow does not always mean that foreign capital will decrease in 
China, because this figure is a 'net' term, and sometimes increasing 
capital inflow is accompanied with increasing capital outflow. In the 
21st century, China may become a country which can export capital to 
some extent, and this means that China will get its own autonomous 
growth power without so much 'net' capital inflow. In this sense, some 
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of the ongoing administrative controls on foreign capital will be able to 
be continued, or the present exceptional tax reduction for foreign 
companies will be able to ended as some recent official documents 
declare. 
     In addition, Table 4 shows that almost all of the net capital 
outflow will come from Japan 12. In this sense, also for China, -the 
international capital relationship with Japan will continue to be important 
also in the future.
     (3)Projected International Competitiveness and balance of trade 
     As the Chinese state planning committee stresses its international 
competitive power (see Lan & Ning (1995)), let us next discuss its 
competitiveness. 
     First, from a different viewpoint, GDP per capita can be 
understood as averaged national labor productivity, and its growth rate 
through this long-term plan is estimated to be 18.4 percent during whole 
period, although this is not expressed in any table. However, if wages 
rise more rapidly than labor productivity, competitive power decreases. 
Therefore, we must compare the growth rates of wages and productivity. 
The projected wage growth rate is 8.1 percent during the same period. 
Therefore, the relative productivity measured by wage level (here called 
'wage productivity') tends to rise; furthermore, in order to compare this 
with other countries', we formulated an indicator as a ratio of 'wage 
productivity' which is called 'COMP' in our model and is expressed as 
follows.
COMPc=WPROc/(Y. x=j,u,k,i,t,p,a WPROx/7) 
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WPROc('wage productivity' in China) =Yc/(Nc*Wc/12) 
WPROj('wage productivity' in Japan)=Yj/(Nj *Wj) 
WPROu('wage productivity' in the USA)=Yu/(Nu*4*Wu) 
WPROk('wage productivity' in South Korea) =Yk/(Nk * Wk) 
WPROi('wage productivity' in Indonesia) =Yi/(Ni * 25 * Wi) 
WPROt('wage productivity' in Thailand) =Yt/(Nt * 25 * Wt) 
WPROp('wage productivity' in the Philippines)=Yp/(Np *25 * Wp) 
WPROa('wage productivity' in Australia) =Ya/(Na*4*Wa) 
     where Y, N and W indicate GDP, population and average wage 
respectively, and their subscripts how their countries, and this indicator 
is used to explain trade balance and ratio of custom duties as shown in 
equation (32) and (35) in our APPENDIX. Therefore, we can investigate 
the trends of trade balance and ratio of custom duties related to this 
indicator. 
     Then by observing Table 5, 6 and 7 the rising trend of China's 
competitive power in comparison to foreign economies will create larger 
trade surplus and allow China to cut its custom duties during the period. 
In the APEC meeting held in Osaka in 1995, the Chinese president Jiang 
Zemin pledged China's largest rade liberalization policy to date: slashing 
tariffs on imports by up to 30 percent starting in 1996. Due to its 
increasing economic power China will be able to keep this promise. 
Furthermore, another common purpose for APEC members is to create 
more liberalized trade, and the deadline it was discussed is 2000 for 
advanced countries, and 2010 for developing countries. According to our 
projection, this goal will also be easy for China to keep, because in 2010 
the Chinese ratio of custom duties to GDP will become the same as the 
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US. 
     In addition, we should notice that in 2010 China, Korea and Japan 
will have the only trade surplus among our 8 countries, and the Chinese 
ratio of trade surplus will be larger than the others. 
     (4)Comparisons of Projected Military, Presence in the Asia-
    Pacific Region 
     Finally, Tables 8 and 9 show projected ratio of military spending 
to GDP and its absolute level, and we have projected this indicator to 
estimate the future balance of political power in the region. Although 
very few econometric projections calculate these indexes, they are very 
important for analyzing the future balance of power in the political field 
which is sometimes critical(for example in the trade friction between 
Japan and the US). Furthermore, military spending is a burden for an 
economy, which can pull down economic growth (as in the US). In this 
sense, the US, Japan, South Korea and Australia have a special 
relationship of 'burden sharing' which is expressed in equations (12), 
(24), (48) and (96) in the APPENDIX, although we do not explain the 
details of these equations. 
     Assuming that Japan, Korea and Australia form a group, and that 
three ASEAN countries can be characterized as, one group, we can 
compare. the ratio of the military spending between these four groups 
shown in Table 10. 
     As shown in this table, we cannot neglect the trend of the 
shrinking American military presence and of the expanding Chinese 
presence, although the Chinese ratio of military expenditure will not 
change during the period. However, if Japan, South Korea and Australia 
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will continue their stance as members of a 'Western Alliance', their 
military presence can compensate for the shrinking U.S. presence to 
some extent. 
    5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
     In this paper, we have provided a long term projection of the 
Chinese . economy and checked some official targets utilizing an 
econometric analysis. Our conclusion is that projections for the Chinese 
economy should be more optimistic, although the government's one year 
projection is higher than ours. 
     However, this does not necessarily mean that China does not need 
any special efforts to maintain its high growth, perhaps because in the 
future China will have to face unparalleled restrictions as a result of such 
unprecedented high growth. These restrictions may include natural 
resources, infrastructures or environmental problems. These problems 
are recognized as key points for China's sustainable development by its 
state planning committee (see Lan & Ning (1995)). Furthermore, we can 
not neglect a possibility that there will be more severe trade frictions 
with advanced countries, because the advanced countries fear China's 
strong competitive power in the future. 
     As "we discussed previously, every country will experience a high 
growth rate period, and maybe trade frictions will probably accompany 
this growth. In this sense, China can learn much from formerly 
developed countries like Japan. 
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1.A11 of the equations of this model are shown in the APPENDIX. 
2.Zhang(1995) showed that foreign direct investment in China are a 
function of cheap Chinese labor as well as its domestic market. _- In the 
sense that foreign direct investment is the most important part of capital 
inflows(BCc), our specification of BCc function can be regarded as a 
function of Zhang's first explaining variable. 
3.These data are the sum total of China's 'direct investment, nie', 
'portfolio investment
, nie' and 'other capital, nie' in the international 
financial statistics of IMF. 
4.The functions of other countries are shown as equations(10), (22), (46), 
(58), (70), (82) and (94) in the APPENDIX. 
5.From version 1 to version 2.3, the KYPAC model had only three 
sectors: Japan, the USand 'ASEAN'. The Chinese sector was added in 
the version 3 model, and at the same time the 'ASEAN' sector was 
divided into Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. 
6.The functions of other countries are shown as equations(97), (98), 
(100), (101), (102), (103).and (104) in the APPENDIX. 
7.The World Bank (1993b) did not include the Philippines and China as 
'high-performing Asian economies (HPAEs)'. However, according to 
these tables, figures and our projections of China's future economy, we 
should include these two countries in the 'HPAEs'.
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8.The figures in 1993 and 1994 are cited from Chinese State Statistical 
Bureau (1995), and the figure in 1995 was from Japan-China Economic 
News, no.21, 1996, Tokyo. These figures were calculated by summing 
up its period's real GDP growth rates and retail price indexes. 
9.TheWorld Bank(1994) provides another projection of the real term 
GDP growth rate from 1994 to 2003, and it is 8.5 percent. This figure 
is almost same as the projection by the Department of Integrated 
Statistics of the State Statistical Bureau of China. 
10.This figere 22.1 percent was calculated as a geometric mean of our 
growth rate during 2000-2005 and during 2005-2010. 
11.As we can see, the Chinese wage function as equation(29) in the 
APPENDIX, its wage is explained by its GDP per capita. Therefore, a 
higher increase in wage must be given by the higher growth rate of GDP 
per capita. 
12.Suzuki(1990) stresses this Japanese role in the international economic 
relationship, although he said that it is too early to tell whether the US 
will continue to be the world's largest debtor.
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Table 1 Projections of FuturePopulation of Eight Countries (million persons)












I China 1185 1223 1295 1392 1.2 0.8 0.6
Japan 125 126 129 132 0.4 0.3 0.1
USA 255 258 266 281 0.6 0.6 0.5
Korea 44 46 48 52 0.9 0.8 0.6
Indonesia 189 195 208 232 1.4 1.1 1.0
Thailand 59 60 64 72 1.3 1.2 1.1
Philippines 66 70 77 92 2.1 1.9 1.6
Australia 18 18 19 20 1.0 0.9 0.9
Figure 1.
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ITable 2-i Comparisons of Projected GDPs of 8 Countries (bn.$)












695 1263 3298 9970 12.7% 21.2% 24.8%
Japan 4711 5119 5434 5657 1.7% 1.2% 0.8%
USA 7118 7954 8658 9252 2.2% 1.7% 1.3%
Korea 431 675 906 1080 9.4% 6.1% 3.6%
Indonesia 172 277 492 791 10.0% 12.2% 9.9%
Thailand 137 218 364 604 9.8% 10.8% 10.7%
Philippines 70 112 181 295 9.9% 10.1% 10.2%
Australia 350 563 847 1190 10.0% 8.5% 7.0%












75 i 85/0 93/85
Fc-hin. 5.4 4.7 6.0 1.2 9.5 -0 .5 9.4
Ja an 16.0 14.4 14.6 17.4 19.6 19.5 6.3 12.8
I USA 6.9 5.3 6.5 7.6 9.5 . 11.3 8.1 5.9
I Korea -0 .7 10.6 -4 .8 22.6 20.3 25.0 8.2 17.2
Indonesia -3 .0 2.6 -1 .7 25.4 18.9 3.5 6.0
Thailand 4.5 6.9 8.9 9.9 17.6 17.0 3.6 15.9
Philippines 4.1 3.4 3.3 2.7 19.0 17.9 -1 .6 6.7
Australia -1 .4 8.7 1.5 17.6 16.9 4.2 6.4






1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

















China 5.4 4.7 6.0 -4 .3 5.3 13.9 18.2
I Japan 16.0 14.4 14.6 17.4 15.8 14.3 7.3 3.7
USA 6.9 5.3 6.5 7.6 9.5 11.3 8.1 5.9
I Korea 81.4 16.0 28.2 25.7 29.2 29.6 15.7 -16 .2
II Indonesia 28.6 121.3 175.3 28.0 27.5 15.9 14.0
Thailand 8.9 7.1 8.6 10.1 17.0 17.2 8.9 15.3
Philippines 5.8 8.5 10.1 13.2 22.1 18.2 18.6 11.3
Australia 6.5 8.9 8.4 17.7 13.2 4.9 7.8
Table 3 Comparisons of Projected GDP per capita of 8 Countries ($)












China 569 975 2440 7162 11.4% 20.1% 24.0%
I. Japan 37291 39652 41453 42960 1.2% 0.9% 0.7%
USA 27571 29882 31637 32903 1.6% 1.1% 0.8%
Korea 9391 14036 18098 20906 8.4% 5.2% 2.9%
II Indonesia 883 1331 2231 3407 8.5% 10.9% 8.8%
II Thailand 2299 3427 5372 8432 8.3% 9.4% 9.4%
PhilPhilippines 991 1431 2113 3171 7.6% 8.1% 8.5%
Australia 19807 30257 43458 58503 8.8% 7.5% 6.1%
Table 4 Comparisons of Projected Balance of Capital of 8 Countries (bn.$)












China 32.7 32.2 29.3 23.6 -0 .3% -1 .9% -4 .2%
Japan -83 .0 -64 .3 -49 .6 -38 .8 -5 .0% -5 .1% -4 .8%
USA 128.4 168.7 207.0 241.5 5.6% 4.2% 3.1%
Korea 8.6 3.9 2.8 4.3 -14 .9% -6 .4% 9.0%
Indonesia 3.8 3.7 3.3 2.9 -0 .5% -2 .1% -2 .5%
Thailand 14.7 14.0 7.2 -15 .2 -1 .0% -12 .5%
Philippines 3.3 3.0 2.7 2.2 -1 .7% -2 .4% -4 .1%
Australia 10.5 7.2 3.9 1.1 -7 .2% -11 .4% -22 .9%













I China 1.067 1.433 2.307 4.001 6.1% 10.0% 11.6%
Japan 0.896 0.839 0.736 0.598 -1.3% -2 .6% -4 .1%
F-SA 1.413 1.348 1.191 0.968 , -0 .9% -2 .4% -4 .1%
I Korea 0.999 0.983 0.882 0.723 -0.3% -2 .1% -3 .9%
I Indonesia 1.115 0.927 0.763 0.604 -3 .6% -3 .8% -4 .6%
Thailand 0.699 0.736 -10.727 0.663 1.0% -0 .2% -1 .8%
Philippines 0.691 0.640 0.561 0.458 -1 .5% -2.6% -4 .0%
Australia 1.171 1.163 1.075 0.910 -0 .1% -1 .6% -3 .3%
I
Table 6 Comparisons of Projected Ratios of Balance of Trade to GDPs of 8 Countries (%)












China 2.9 3.2 4.3 6.3 2.0% 6.1% 7.9%
Japan 2.3 1.7 1.5 1.5 -6 .5% -1 .1% -0 .3%
USA -1 .6 -1 .1 -1.2 -1 .3 -2 .2% 2.2% 4.2%
Korea 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.4 -6 .6% -2 .4% -0 .5%
Indonesia 6.1 3.9 -2 .6 -5 .4 -8 .6% 15.7%
Thailand -4 .2 -9 .5 -14 .8 -16 .4 17.5% 9.4% 2.1%
Philippines -3 .9 -6 .5 -10 .3 -12 .3 10.6% 9.6% 3.5%
Australia -1 .5 -5 .1 -6 .8 -6 .9 27.7% 5.9 0.3%
Table 7 Comparisons of Projected Ratios of Custom Duties to GDPs of 8 Countries (%)












I China 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.3 -4 .6% -6 .4% -7 .1%
Japan 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 -5 .6% -3 .3% -1 .6%
USA 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 -0 .4% -0 .1% 0.2%
Korea 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.5 2.6% 0.8% 0.3%
Indonesia 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 0.5% 0.9% 0.4%
Thailand 3.5 3.8 4.0 4.3 2.2% 1.1% 0.6%
Philippines 5.3 5.0 4.9 4.7 -0 .8% -0.6% -0 .6%
Australia 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.2 3.1% 2.9% 4.1%
I
Table 8 Comparisons of Projected Ratios of Military Expenditures toGDPs of 8 Countries (%)












Fc-hina 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 -1 .3% -1 .4% -0 .7%
Japan 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 -0 .4% -0 .4% -0 .4%
I USA 4.7 4.8 4.8 4.7 0.4% -0 .1% -0 .2%
Korea 3.8 4.5 4.9 5.2 3.1% 1.9% 1.1%
Indonesia 1.5 1.3 1.1 0.9 -3 .0% -4 .1% -3 .4%
Thailand 3.0 2.9 3.0 3.1 -1 .0% 0.7% 0.7%
Philippines 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 -0 .3% -0 .1% -0 .1%
Australia 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.6 0.8% 0.3% 0.1%
Table 9 Comparisons of Projected Military Expenditures of 8 Countries n.$)













China 7.7 13.1 32.0 93.5 11.2% 19.5% 23.9%
Japan 41.8 44.5 46.4 47.5 1.3% 0.8% 0.4%
USA 270.3 308.1 333.4 352.6 2.7% 1.6% 1.1%
Korea 16.6 30.3 44.6 56.0 12.8% 8.0% 4.7%
Indonesia 2.3 3.1 4.5 6.1 6.8% 7.5% 6.2%
Thailand 4.0 6.1 10.5 18.0 8.7% 11.6% 11.5%
Philippines 1.4 2.1 3.4 5.6 9.5% 9.9% 10.1%
Australia 7.8 13.1 20.0 28.3 10.8% 8.9% 7.2%
Table 10. Projected Balance of Military Presence of 4 Groups of Nations 
                              1993 2010 
The US/21 69 41 
Japan + South Korea + Australia 25 31 
Indonesia + Thailand + The Philippines 3 7 
China 3 22 
total 100 100
   1 The reason why the US's figure is divided by 2 in this comparison is that the US can 
use half of its military armaments in the Asia-Pacific region.
APPENDIX THE EQUATIONS OF 
       THE KYOTO UNIVERSITY PACIFIC RIM MODEL (KYPAC-4)
TYPE I MODEL USED FOR FINAL TEST
I. JAPAN MODEL 
1:Yj --- (Production) 
  logYj/Nj=-1.32094+0.81800*logKj/Nj [+0.82448*AR(1)] 
          (-7.03) (22.23) 
   adj.RR=0.9974 D.W.=2.4 (1953-1993) 
2:Ij --- (Investment) 
  loglJ=-0.22078+1.03319*log(Sj+BCj)-0.09881444*log(CDj -1/Yj_1) 
       (-0.93) (77.40) (-2.00) 
  adj.RR=0.9961 D.W.=1.2 (1952-1993) 
3:Kj --- (Capital Stock) 
  Kj=(1-dj)*Kj -1+Ij-1 
4:Sj --- (Saving)
Sj=7.30310+0.20250*logYj -1[+0.37347*AR(1)]
    (0.96) (39.42) 
  adj.RR=0.9894 D.W.=1.9 (1954-1993) 
5: Wj --- (Monthly Wage) 
  Wj=57.5290+114544*Yj -l/N _1 
      (1.87) (40.91) 
  adj.RR=0.9761 D.W.=1.4 (1952-1993) 
6.EXj --- (Exports) 
  EXj=BTj+IMj 
7.IMj --- (Imports)
logIMj=-1.79461+0.91941*logYj -1[+0.48137*AR(1)]
        (-11.94) (53.34) 
  adj.RR=0.9910 D.W.=1.8 (1948-1993) 
8:BTj --- (Balance of Trade)
  BTj/Yj=0.07381-0.00000057084*Wj -1/(Yj-1/Nj-1)[+0.64888*AR(1)] 
        (3.13) (-3.01) 
  adj.RR=0.6989 D.W.=1.8 (1952-1993) 
9:COMPj --- (Competitiveness)
     COMPj=Yj/(Nj *Wj)/(((Yu/(Nu*4*Wu))+(Yc/(Nc*Wc/12))+(Yk/(Nk*Wk)) 
       +(Yi/(Ni * 25 * Wi))+(Yt/(Nt * 25 * Wt))+(Yp/(Np * 25 * Wp))+(YA/(Na * 4 * Wa)))/7) 
10:BCj --- (Balance of Capital) 
  BCj=18.3458-16.7996*(Wj/((4* u+Wc/12+Wk+25 *Wi+25 * Wt+25 * Wp+4*Wa)/7)) 
      (3.45) (-7.86) 
   adj.RR=0.6031 D.W.=0.7 (1953-1993) 
11:CDj --- (Custom Duty) 
  CDj/Yj=0.0037297-0.0117192*BTj/Yj 
         (2.12) (-1.53) 
  adj.RR=0.9099 D.W.=1.7 (1954-1993) 
12:MEj --- (Military Expenditure) 
  MEj=0.19700+0.0082885*Yj _1 
      (11.17) (31.19) 
   adj.RR=0.9828 D.W.=1.2 (1952-1969) 
   MEj/Yj=0.0081048+0.00428127*Yj -2/(Yu-2+Yk-2+Yi-2+Yt-2+Yp-2+Ya_2) 
        (30.77) (5.75) 
  adj.RR=0.5824 D.W.=1.1 (1970-1993) 
II. USA MODEL
13.Yu --- (Production) 
   logYu/Nu=-0.28206+0.90959*logKu/Nu[+0.65415*AR(1)] 
          (-3.54) (60.46) 
   adj.RR=0.9985 D.W.=2.0 (1946-1993) 
14:Iu --- (Investment) 
   loglu=-0.63326+0.87317*log(Su _1+BC _1)-0.34042*log(MEu/Yu) 
        (-1.56) (15.48) (-2.48) 
   adj.RR=0.9964 D.W.=1.9 (1952-1993) 
15:Ku --- (Capital Stock) 
   Ku=(1-du)*Ku_1+Iu_1 
16:Su --- (Saving) 
   Su=3 7.5201 +0.15 473 *Yu [+0.87491 * AR(1) ]
     (1.04) (17.33) 
   adj.RR=0.9962 -D.W.=1.9 (1951-1993) 
17:Wu --- (Weekly Wage) 
   logWu=9.07529+0.77883 * Yu/Nu [+0.79645 * AR(1)] 
       (103.75) (44.43) 
   adj.RR=0.9991 D.W.=2.3 (1946-1993) 
18:EXu --- (Exports) 
   EXu=BTu+IMu 
19:IMu --- (Imports) 
   IMu=-41.3562+0.0964024 *Yu [+0.69298 *AR(1)] 
       (-5.84) (42.39) 
   adj.RR=0.9970 D.W.=1.9 (1948-1993) 
20:BTu --- (Balance of Trade) 
   BTu/Yu=-0.0131584+0.0153314*COMPu-0.32434*EXj/Yu 
           (-0.61) (0.97) (-1.42) 
   adj.RR=0.8473 D.W.=1.4 (1954-1993) 
21:COMPu --- (Competitiveness) 
  COMPu=Yu/(Nu*4*Wu)/(((Yj/(Nj *Wj))+(Yc/(Nc* We/12))+(Yk/(Nk*Wk)) 
     +(Yi/(Ni * 25 * Wi))+(Yt/(Nt * 25 * Wt))+(Yp/(Np * 25 * Wp))+(Ya/(Na*4 * Wa)))/7) 
22:BCu --- (Balance of Capital) 
  BCu/Yu=0.0066184-0.0017475 *(4 * Wu/((Wj+Wc/12+Wk+25 * Wi+25 *Wt+25 * Wp+4 * Wa)%7)) 
          (0.67) (-0.84) 
   adj.RR=0.6417 D.W.=1.8 (1954-1993) 
23:CDu --- (Custom Duty) 
  CDu/Yu=0.0025712-0.0122889*BTu/Yu[+0.87062*AR(1)] 
         (10.98) (-2.05) 
   adj.RR=0.8735 D.W.=2.6 (1954-1993) 
24:MEu --- (Military Expenditure) 
  MEu/Yu=0.0472726+0.0055780*Yu/(Yj +Yk+Yi+Yt+Yp+Ya)[+0.73133 *AR(1)]
         (8.79) (3.93) 
   adj.RR=0.9082 D.W.=1.4 - (1954-1993) 
III. CHINA MODEL 
25:Yc --- (Production) 
   logYc/Nc=-6.12727+0.27350 * logKc/Nc 
          (-22.28) (8.52) 
   adj.RR=0.6358 D.W.=0.2 (1952-1993) 
26:Ic --- (Investment) 
  Ic=25.0765 +0.69395 * (Sc+BCc) [+0.84204 *AR(1)] 
     (2.19) (10.74) 
  adj.RR=0.9562 D.W.=1.5 (1953-1993) 
27:Kc ---'(Capital Stock) 
   Kc=(1-dc)*Kc_1+Ic_1
28:Sc --- (Saving) 
   logSc=-22.1441+0.61242*logYc[+1.00657*AR(1)] 
        (-6.38) (3.10) 
   adj.RR=0.9944 D.W.=1.0 (1953-1993) 
29: We --- (Yearly Wage) 
  logWc=9.89230+0.47955 *logYc/Nc[+0.93013 *AR(1)] 
       (13.42) (4.41) 
   adj.RR=0.9510 D.W.=1.6 (1953-1994) 
30:EXc --- (Exports) 
  EXc=BTC+IMC 
31:IMc --- (Imports) 
  logIMc=-5.85894+0.76426*logYc[+1.01971 *AR(1)] 
         (-3.82) (3.05) 
   adj.RR=0.9870 D.W.=1.4 (1952-1994) 
32:BTc --- (Balance of Trade) 
   BTc/Yc=-0.0195698+0.0128539*COMPc -1+0.0303828*D9091 
         (-2.41) (2.01) (3.48) 
   adj.RR=0.23087 D.W.=1.0 (1954-1993) 
33:COMPc --- (Competitiveness) 
  COMPc=Yc/(Nc*Wc/12)/(((Yj/(Nj * Wj))+(Yu/(Nu *4*Wu))+(Yk/(Nk*Wk)) 
     +(Yi/(Ni * 25 * Wi))+(Yt/(Nt * 25 * Wt))+(Yp/(Np * 25 * Wp)) +(Ya/(Na* 4 W a)))/7) 
34:BCc --- (Balance of Capital) 
  BCc=O (1945-1981) 
  BCc=5.20770-35.3497*(Wc/12/((Wj+4* Wu+Wk+25 * Wi+25 * Wt+25 *Wp+4*Wa)/7)) 
      (3.84) (-2.98) 
   adj.RR=0.1679 D.W.=1.3 (1982-1993) 
35:CDc --- (Custom Duty) 
  logCDc/Yc=-4.99989-0.61104*logCOMPc[+0.93926*AR(1)] 
             (-6.92) (-1.36) 
   adj.RR=0.9013 D.W.=1.9 (1954-1993) 
.36:MEc --- (Military Expenditure) 
  MEc=2.07678+0.0128417*Yc[+0.93107*AR(1)] 
      (0.69) (2.89) 
   adj.RR=0.8767 D.W.=1.4 (1953-1994) 
IV. KOREA MODEL 
37.Yk --- (Production) 
  logYk/Nk=-1.74210+0.77145 *logKk/Nk 
           (-5.72) (19.31) 
   adj.RR=0.9029 D.W.=0.2 (1953-1993) 
38:1k --- (Investment) 
  Ik=2.71222+0.94569*(Sk+BCk)-164.737*CDk _l-1 
     (2.01) (78.01) (-2.63) 
   adj.RR=0.9964 D.W.=1.9 (1954-1993) 
39:Kk --- (Capital Stock) 
   Kk=(1-dk)*Kk_1+Ik_1 
40:Sk --- (Saving) 
  logSk=-2.89139+1.39621*logYk _1[+0.57437*AR(1)] 
        (-8.21) (13.90) 
  adj.RR=0.9648 D.W.=1.8 (1954-1993) 
41:Wk. --- (Monthly Wage) 
  logWk=11.5598+0.94431 *logYk/Nk[+0.81866*AR(1)] 
       (37.64) (22.21) 
   adj.RR=0.9951 D.W.=2.3 (1954-199.3) 
42:EXk --- (Exports)
   EXk=IMk+BTk 
 43:IMk --- (Imports) 
    loglMK=-2.12442+ 1.19222* logYk 
          (-21.18) (39.58) 
    adj.RR=0.9745 D.W.=0.6 (1952-1993) 
 44:BTk --- (Balance of Trade) 
   BTk/Yk=-0.17083+0.0180763 *Yk/(Nk*Wk)[+0.83081 *AR(1)] 
           (-2.24) (1.67) 
    adj.RR=0.7873 D.W.=1.4 (1954-1993) 
 45:COMPk --- (Competitiveness) 
   COMPk=Yk/(Nk*Wu)/(((Yj/(Nj *Wj))+(Yu/(Nu*4*Wu))+(Yc/(Nc*Wc/12)) 
      +(Yi/(Ni * 25 * Wi))+(Yt/(Nt * 25 * Wt))+(Yp/(Np * 25 * Wp))+(Ya/(Na* 4 * W a)))/7) 
 46:BCk --- (Balance of Capital) 
   BCk=1.30449-0.0446701 *(BCj+BCu+BCc+BCi+BCt+BCp+BCa)[+0.66425 *AR(1)] 
        (1.57) (-3.41) 
    adj.RR=0.6549 D.W.=1.3 (1954-1993) 
 47:CDk --- (Custom Duty) 
   logCDk/Yk=-3.44899+0.33823 *loglMk/Yk[+0.74065 *AR(1)] 
            (-13.00) (2.00) 
    adj.RR=0.6091 D.W.=1.6 (1954-1993) 
 48:MEk --- (Military Expenditure) 
   MEk/Yk=0.0396957+0.0761997*Yk/Yj [+0.86289*AR(1)] 
          (6.72) (1.67) 
   adj.RR=0.7314 D.W.=1.8 (1954-1993) 
V. INDONESIA MODEL 
 49:Yi --- (Production) 
   logYi=-3.97769+0.93825 * logYi+0.28969 *logNi
        (-2.92) (29.88) 
   adj.RR=0.9910 D.W.=1.0              (1 
50:Ii --- (Investment) 
   Ii=0.88541 *(Si _,+BCi_1) 
     (31.11) 
   adj.RR=0.9593 D.W.=1.5 
51:Ki --- (Capital Stock) 
   Ki=(1-di)*Ki _,+Ii_1 
52:Si --- (Saving) 
      (-4.07) (26.65) 
   adj.RR=0.9857 D.W.=2.2 
53:Wi --- (Daily Wage) 
      (-0.85) (7.24) 
   adj.RR=0.9051 D.W.=1.8 
54:EXi --- (Exports) 
       (-0.73) (1.02) 
    [+0.86276*AR(1)] 
   adj.RR=0.9646 D.W.=2.1 
55:IMi --- (Imports) 
  IMi=0.0538563 *Yi+0.43338*Ii 
       (1.62) (4.48) 
   adj.RR=0.9718 D.W.=1.4 







Wi  =-0.42604+4733.11 *Yi/Ni[+0.91410*AR(1)]
1952-1993)




57:COMPi --- (Competitiveness) 
  COMPi=Yi/(Ni * 25 * Wi)/(((Yj/(Nj * Wj ))+(Yu/(Nu * 4* Wu))+(Yc/(Nc* We/12))+ 
    (Yk/(Nk *Wk))+(Yt/(Nt * 25 * Wt))+(Yp/(Np * 25 * Wp)) +(Ya/(Na * 4* W a)))/7) 
58:BCi --- (Balance of Capital) 
  BCi=2.33521-4.62093 * (25 * Wi/((Wj +4 * Wu+Wc/12+Wk+25 * Wt+25 * Wp+4 * Wa)/7)) 
      (6.01) (-2.76). 
   adj.RR=0.1455 D.W.=0.4 (1954-1993) 
59:CDi -- (Custom Duty) 
  CDi/Yi=0.0063400+0.314330*IMi/Yi[+0.84070*AR(1)] 
          (1.51) (1.68) 
   adj.RR=0.6938 D.W.=1.4 (1953-1993) 
60:MEi --- (Military Expenditure) 
   logMEi=-2.27941+0.63185*logYi 
         (-7.41) (7.17) 
   adj.RR=0.8743 D.W.=1.8 (1952-1993) 
VI. THAILAND MODEL 
61.Yt --- (Production) 
   logYt=-11.6624+0.67796*logKt+1.18524*logNt 
        (-2.72) (8.25) (2.79) 
   adj.RR=0.9980 D.W.=1.3 (1951-1993) 
62:It --- (Investment) 
  It=3.77451+0.78294*(St+BCt)-109.279* (CDt/Yt)[+0.27049*AR(1)] 
     (2.33) (48.43) (-2.32) 
   adj.RR=0.9901 D.W.=2.0 (1953-1993) 
63:Kt --- (Capital. Stock) 
   Kt=(1-dt)*Kt_1+It_1 
64:St --- (Saving) 
  logSt=-1.99625+1.20315 *logYt[+0.40303 *AR(1)] 
       (-22.49) (38.22) 
   adj.RR=0.9897 D.W.=1.6 (1951-1993) 
65:Wt --- (Daily Wage) 
  logWt=7.24453+0.76937*log(Yt/Nt)[+0.66925 *AR(1)] 
       (23.14) (19.48) 
  adj.RR=0.9885 D.W.=1.8 (1954-1993) 
66:EXt --- (Exports) 
  logEXt=-10.8517+0.19245*logCOMPt        
. (-13.39) (1.06) 
       +1.53618*log(Yj _1+Yu_1+Yc_1+Yk_1+Yi_1+Yp_1+Ya_1)[+0.81535*AR(1)] 
       (15.86) 
   adj.RR=0.9942 D.W.=1.6 (1954-1993) 
67:IMt --- (Imports) 
  IMt=-1.70311+0.38172*Yt[+0.81781 *AR( )] 
       (-1.61) (21.45) 
   adj.RR=0.9913 D.W.=1.5 (1947-1993) 
68:BTt --- (Balance of Trade) 
  BTt=EXt-IMt 
69:COMPt --- (Competitiveness) 
  COMPt=Yt/(Nt *25 *Wt)/((((Yj/(Nj * Wj))+(Yu/(Nu *4* Wu))+(Yc/(Nc* We/12))+ 
    (Yk/(Nk *Wk))+(Yi/(Ni * 25 * Wi))+(Yp/(Np * 25 * Wp))+(Ya/(Na* 4 * Wa)))/7) 
70:BCt --- (Balance of Capital) 
  BCt/Yt=0.13493-0.40612 * (25 *Wt/((Wj+4 * Wu+Wc/12+Wk+25 * Wi+25 * Wp+4 * Wa)/7)) 
         (3.53) (-2.64) 
  adj.RR=0.1326 D.W.=0.5 (1954-1993) 
71:CDt --- (Custom Duty)
  CDt/Yt=0.013904-0.0736522*IMt/Yt[+0.89097*AR(1)] 
         (1.78) (3.53) 
   adj.RR=0.4632 D.W.=2.1 (1954-1993) 
72:MEt --- (Military Expenditure) 
   logMEt=-3.71094+1.06793*logYt[+0.52424*AR(1)] 
         (-28.67) (23.56)   
. adj.RR=0.9888 D.W.=1.8 (1949-1993) 
VII. THE PHILIPPINE MODEL 
73:Yp --- (Production) 
   logYp=-13.1167+0.70662* logKp+1.22625 * logNp 
        (-12.71) (12.31) (10.61) 
   adj.RR=0.9814 D.W.=0.2 (1951-1993) 
74:Ip --- (Investment) 
  loglp=1.10952+0.46279 * (Sp+BCp) 
       (2.41) (4.83) 
   adj.RR=0.9802 D.W.=1.8 (1951-1993) 
75:Kp --- (Capital Stock) 
   Kp=(1-dp)*Kp-1+Ip-1 
76:Sp --- (Saving) 
   logSp=-2.10901 + 1. 3745 * logYp [+0.82958 *AR(1)] 
         (-8.36) (9.06) 
   adj.RR=0.9827 D.W.=2.3 (1951-1993) 
77: Wp --- (Daily Wage) 
  Wp=-0.52412+5854.52*Yp/Np[+0.94689*AR(1)] 
      (-0.91) (11.61) 
   adj.RR=0.9651 D.W.=2.0 (1951-1993) 
78:EXp --- (Exports) 
  logEXp=-7.19393+0.38122*log*COMPp+1.02273 *log(Yj+Yu+Yc+Yk+Yi+Yt+Ya) 
         (-17.70) (2.04) (20.57) 
      [+0.61987*AR(1)] 
   adj.RR=0.9887 D.W.=1.6 (1954-1993) 
79:IMp --- (Imports) 
   logIMp=-0.68717+0.78947 * logYp+0.33654 * logSp 
         (-3.69) . (4.34) (2.45) 
   adj.RR=0.9817 D.W.=2.2 (1947-1993) 
80:BTp --- (Balance of Trade) 
   BTp=EXp-IMp 
81:COMPp --- (Competitiveness) 
  COMPp=Yp/(Np*25 Wp)/((((Yj/(Nj * Wj))+(Yu/(Nu*4* Wu))+(Yc/(Nc* We/12))+ 
     (Yk/(Nk *Wk)+(Yt/(Nt * 25 * Wt))+(Yi/(Ni * 25 * Wi))+(Ya/(Na *4 *Wa)))/7) 
82:BCp --- (Balance of Capital) 
  BCp=1.60820-2.95494 * (25 *Wp/((Wj +4 *Wu+W c/ 12+ Wk+25 * W i+25 * Wt+4 * Wa)/7)) 
       (6.36) (-3.81) 
   adj.RR=0.2578 D.W.=0.5 (1954-1993) 
83:CDp --- (Custom Duty) 
  CDp/Yp=-0.005 3074+0.1747 0 * IMp/Yp 
           (-1.22) (8.03) 
   adj.RR=0.6017 D.W.=0.9 (1951-1993) 
84:MEp --- (Military Expenditure) 
  MEp=0.0369452+0.0182341 *Yp[+0.84679*AR(1)] 
       (0.45) (8.05) 
   adj.RR=0.9687 D.W.=1.5 (19521-1993) 
VIII. AUSTRALIA MODEL
85:Ya --- (Production) 
         (-3.10) (2.77) 
   adj.RR=0.9989 D.W.=2.0 
86:Ia --- (Investment) 
      (49.37) 
  adj.RR=0.9871 
87:Ka --- (Capital Stock) 
   Ka=(1-da) * Ka -1 +Ia-1. 
88:Sa --- (Saving) 
  Sa=0.84043+0.22281 *Ya 
     (0.33) (14.65) 
   d' RR 0 98 3 
89: 
90:
logYa=-10.6553+1.10267                 *logNa+0.83500*logKa[+0.68717*AR(1)]
    (12.44) 
(1953-1993)
logIa=0.84059*log Sa+B                 Ca)-0.0990418*logCDa/Ya
    (-1.40) 
1953-1993)
a ~. _ . 5 D.W.=1.6 (1954-1993) 
W a --- (Weekly Wage) 
logWa=9.44078+0.83820*                logYa/Na[+0.88331 *AR(1)] 
     (35.81) (16.03) 
adj.RR=0.9970 D.W.=1.8                 (1953-1993) 
EXa    --- (Exports) 
EXa=-6.51929+ 1120000 * Ya/(Na *4 * Wa)+0.0032351 * (Yj +Yu+Yc+Yk+Yi+Yt+Yp)
       (-1.19) (1.45) 
     [+0.75630*AR(1)] 
   adj.RR=0.9857 D.W.=1.4 (1953-1993) 
91:IMa --- (Imports) 
  logIMa=-1.86607+0.97114 * logYa 
         (-32.68) (71.08) 
  adj.RR=0.9921 D.W.=1.0 (1953-1993) 
92:BTa --- (Balance of Trade) 
  BTa=EXa-IMa 
93:COMPa --- (Competitiveness)
(8.28)
  COMPa=Ya/(Na*4 * Wa)/((((Yj/(Nj * Wj ))+(Yu/(Nu *4* Wu))+(Yc/(Nc* We/12))+ 
     (Yk/(Nk *Wk)+(Yi/(Ni * 25 * W i))+(Yt/(Nt * 25 * Wt))+ (Yp/(Np * 25 * Wp)))/7) 
94:BCa --- (Balance of Capital) 
  BCa=19.4044-5.95505 * (4 * Wa/((Wj +4 *Wu+Wc/12+Wk+25 * Wi+25 * Wt+25 * Wp)/7)) 
      (5.83) (-4.78) 
  adj.RR=0.3589 D.W.=0.4 (1954-1993) 
95:CDa --- (Custom Duty) 
  CDa/Ya=0.0248329-0.0132494*COMPa[+0.86468*AR(1)] 
          (4.24) (-2.43) 
   adj.RR=0.8358 D.W.=1.6 (1954-1993) 
96:MEa --- (Military Expenditure) 
  logMEa/Ya=-3.13617+0.17720*logMEu/Yu[+0.87036*AR(1)] 
           (-6.60) (1.07) 
  adj.RR=0.8585 D.W.=1.5 (1953-1993)
TYPE II MODEL USED FOR PROJECTIONS 
  ---- the following equations are changed or added; 
25:Yc --- (Production) 
  Yc=-911.923+0.36484*Kc+0.0010339*Nc[+0.95113 *AR(1)] 
     (-1.95) (2.93) (2.58) 
  adj.RR=0.9362 D.W.=0.9 (1952-1993)
97:dj --- (Depreciation Rates) 
  dj=-0.63845+0.33088*Kj _t/ lj_1[+0:24162*AR(1)] 
      (-2.11) (2.14) 
  adj.RR=0.1586 D.W.=1.9 (1975-1993) 
98:du --- (Depreciation Rates) 
   du=-0.57067+0.68099*Ku _1/Yu_1 
      (-3.64) (3.91) 
  adj.RR=0.4430 D.W.=1.1 (1975-1993) 
99:dc --- (Depreciation Rates) 
  dc=-0.0739765+0.13635*Kc _9/Yc_9[+0.56435 *AR(1)] 
       (-1.19) (3.37) 
  adj.RR=0.6917 D.W.=1.8 (1962-1993) 
100:dk --- (Depreciation Rates) 
  dk=-0.53053+0.43016*Kk _3/Yk_3[+0.50246*AR(1)] 
      (-1.32) (1.50) 
   adj.RR=0.2560 D.W.=2.4 (1975-1994) 
101:di --- (Depreciation Rates) 
  di=-1.17249+0.51625*Ki -4/Yi._4[+0.32413*AR(1)] 
      (-1.53) (1.49) 
  adj.RR=0.1810 D.W.=2.0 (1972-1993) 
102:dt --- (Depreciation Rates) 
  dt=-0.17936+1.12580*It _5/Kt_S[-0.22303*AR(1)] 
      (-1.71) (2.81) 
   adj.RR=0.2802. D.W.=2.2 (1979-1993) 
103:dp --- (Depreciation Rates) 
  dp=-0.13998+1.31290*Ip _7/Kp_7[-0.21362*AR(1)] 
      (-1.69) (1.29) 
  adj.RR=0.1039 D.W.=2.8 (1983-1994) 
104:da --- (Depreciation Rates) 
   da=-0.77372+0.26155 * Ka _1/Ya_1 [+0.59618 *AR(1)] 
      (-2.72) (2.64) 
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